Adoption and non-adoption of a shared electronic summary record in England: a mixed-method case study

Publisher version: http://www.bmj.com/content/340/bmj.c3111.full?sid=fcb22308-64fe-4070-9067-15a172b3aea

Summary care record early adopter programme: an independent evaluation by University College London.

Benefits The main potential benefit of the SCR is considered to be in emergency and unscheduled care settings, especially for people who are unconscious, confused, unsure of their medical details, or unable to communicate effectively in English. Other benefits may include improved efficiency of care and avoidance of hospital admission, but it is too early for potential benefits to be verified or quantified. Progress As of end April 2008, the SCR of 153,188 patients in the first two Early Adopter sites (Bolton and Bury) had been created. A total of 614,052 patients in four Early Adopter sites had been sent a letter informing them of the programme and their choices for opting out of having a SCR. Staff attitudes and usage The evaluation found that many NHS staff in Early Adopter sites (which had been selected partly for their keenness to innovate in ICT) were enthusiastic about the SCR and keen to see it up and running, but a significant minority of GPs had chosen not to participate in the programme and others had deferred participation until data quality improvement work was completed. Whilst 80 per cent of patients interviewed were either positive about the idea of having a SCR or ?did not mind?, others were strongly opposed ?on principle?. Staff who had attempted to use the SCR when caring for patients felt that the current version was technically immature (describing it as ?clunky? and ?complicated?), and were looking forward to a more definitive version of the technology. A comparable technology (the Emergency Care Summary) introduced in Scotland two years ago is now working well, and over a million records have been accessed in emergency and out-of-hours care. Patient attitudes and awareness Having a SCR is optional (people may opt out if they wish, though fewer than one per cent of people in Early Adopter sites have done so) and technical security is said to be high via a system of password protection and strict access controls. Nevertheless, the evaluation showed that recent stories about data loss by government and NHS organisations had raised concerns amongst both staff and patients that human fallibility could potentially jeopardise the operational security of the system. Despite an extensive information programme to inform the public in Early Adopter sites about the SCR, many patients interviewed by the UCL team were not aware of the programme at all. This raises important questions about the ethics of an ?implied consent? model for creating the SCR. The evaluation recommended that the developers of the SCR should consider a model in which the patient is asked for ?consent to view? whenever a member of staff wishes to access their record. Not a single patient interviewed in the evaluation was confident that the SCR would be 100 per cent secure, but they were philosophical about the risks of security breaches. Typically, people said that the potential benefit of a doctor having access to key medical details in an emergency outweighed the small but real risk of data loss due to human or technical error. Even patients whose medical record contained potentially sensitive data such as mental health problems, HIV or drug use were often (though not always) keen to have a SCR and generally trusted NHS staff to treat sensitive data appropriately. However, they and many other NHS patients wanted to be able to control which staff members were allowed to access their record at the point of care. Some doctors, nurses and receptionists, it seems, are trusted to view a person?s SCR, whereas others are not, and this is a decision which patients would like to make in real time

The devil's in the detail: Final report of the independent evaluation of the Summary Care Record and HealthSpace programmes

professionals, NHS staff, service users, citizens, academics and evaluation scholars. It should be read in conjunction with our Year 1 reports on the SCR programme (May 2008) 1 and data quality (May 2008). 2 2. The SCR is an electronic summary of key health data, currently drawn from a patient’s GP-held electronic record and accessible over a secure Internet connection by authorised healthcare staff. It is one of a suite of innovations being introduced as part of the National Programme for IT in the English National Health Service (NHS) and delivered via a central ‘Spine’. Policy documents published in 2005-8 anticipated a number of benefits of the SCR, including: 3-6 a. Better care (i.e. the SCR would improve clinical decision-making); b. Safer care (i.e. the SCR would reduce risk of harm, especially medication errors); c. More efficient care (e.g. the SCR would make consultations quicker); d. More equitable care (i.e. the SCR would be particularly useful in patients unable to communicate or advocate for themselves); e. Reduction in onward referral (e.g. the SCR would avoid unnecessary ambulanc

Soziale Inklusion durch technikgestützte Kommunikationsangebote im Stadt-Land-Vergleich (Sonia)

Im Projekt „SONIA – Soziale Inklusion durch technikgestützte Kommunikationsangebote im Stadt-Land-Vergleich“ wurde in sowohl städtisch als auch ländlich geprägten Sozialräumen über drei Jahre untersucht, inwiefern und unter welchen Bedingungen sich die soziale Teilhabe von Seniorinnen und Senioren durch eine über Tablet-PCs bereitgestellte Kommunikationsplattform fördern lässt. Es zeigt sich, dass die Einführung neuer IKT-Anwendungen ein Anlass für soziale Vernetzung sein kann, soziale Dynamiken auslöst und somit die soziale Teilhabe von Seniorinnen und Senioren verbessern kann. Eine sinnvolle Kombination von Online- und Offline-Aktivitäten bzw. -angeboten kann sich gegenseitig unterstützen und fördern. Eine Tablet-Lerngruppe beispielsweise fördert die selbständige Tablet-Nutzung, die Tablet-Nutzung kann aber auch umgekehrt zu neuen sozialen Aktivitäten und Verabredungen im nicht-virtuellen Raum führen. Allerdings reicht die alleinige Bereitstellung von Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien bzw. Techniken allgemein nicht aus, um die soziale Teilhabe zu fördern oder soziale Isolation zu verringern. Vielmehr müssen darüber hinaus die technischen Lösungen in das spezifische soziale Umfeld eingebettet sowie die entsprechenden individuellen Technik-Kompetenzen und sozialen Strukturen aufgebaut werden. Der Einsatz von Tablets hat im SONIA-Projekt deshalb zu mehr sozialer Teilhabe geführt, weil darüber eine Kommunikationsplattform bereitgestellt wurde, die Seniorinnen und Senioren gelernt haben, mit Plattform und Tablets umzugehen, und sich dabei wechselseitig kennengelernt und sozial vernetzt haben

Adoption, non-adoption, and abandonment of a personal electronic health record: case study of HealthSpace.

OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the policy making process, implementation by NHS organisations, and patients' and carers' experiences of efforts to introduce an internet accessible personal electronic health record (HealthSpace) in a public sector healthcare system. DESIGN: Mixed method, multilevel case study. SETTING: English National Health Service; the basic HealthSpace technology (available throughout England) and the advanced version (available in a few localities where this option had been introduced) were considered. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: National statistics on invitations sent, HealthSpace accounts created, and interviews and ethnographic observation of patients and carers. Data analysis was informed by a socio-technical approach which considered macro and micro influences on both adoption and non-adoption of innovations, and by the principles of critical discourse analysis. PARTICIPANTS: 56 patients and carers (of whom 21 opened a basic HealthSpace account, 20 had diabetes but were not initially using HealthSpace, and 15 used advanced HealthSpace accounts to exchange messages with their general practitioner), 3000 pages of documents (policies, strategies, business plans, minutes of meetings, correspondence), observational field notes, and 160 interviews with policy makers, project managers, and clinical staff. RESULTS: Between 2007 and October 2010, 172 950 people opened a basic HealthSpace account. 2913 (0.13% of those invited) opened an advanced account, compared with 5-10% of the population anticipated in the original business case. Overall, patients perceived HealthSpace as neither useful nor easy to use and its functionality aligned poorly with their expectations and self management practices. Those who used email-style messaging were positive about its benefits, but enthusiasm beyond three early adopter clinicians was low, and fewer than 100 of 30 000 patients expressed interest. Policy makers' hopes that "deploying" HealthSpace would lead to empowered patients, personalised care, lower NHS costs, better data quality, and improved health literacy were not realised over the three year evaluation period. CONCLUSION: Unless personal electronic health records align closely with people's attitudes, self management practices, identified information needs, and the wider care package (including organisational routines and incentive structures for clinicians), the risk that they will be abandoned or not adopted at all is substantial. Conceptualising such records dynamically (as components of a socio-technical network) rather than statically (as containers for data) and employing user centred design techniques might improve their chances of adoption and use. The findings raise questions about how eHealth programmes in England are developed and approved at policy level

Adoption, non-adoption, and abandonment of a personal electronic health record: case study of HealthSpace.

OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the policy making process, implementation by NHS organisations, and patients' and carers' experiences of efforts to introduce an internet accessible personal electronic health record (HealthSpace) in a public sector healthcare system. DESIGN: Mixed method, multilevel case study. SETTING: English National Health Service; the basic HealthSpace technology (available throughout England) and the advanced version (available in a few localities where this option had been introduced) were considered. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: National statistics on invitations sent, HealthSpace accounts created, and interviews and ethnographic observation of patients and carers. Data analysis was informed by a socio-technical approach which considered macro and micro influences on both adoption and non-adoption of innovations, and by the principles of critical discourse analysis. PARTICIPANTS: 56 patients and carers (of whom 21 opened a basic HealthSpace account, 20 had diabetes but were not initially using HealthSpace, and 15 used advanced HealthSpace accounts to exchange messages with their general practitioner), 3000 pages of documents (policies, strategies, business plans, minutes of meetings, correspondence), observational field notes, and 160 interviews with policy makers, project managers, and clinical staff. RESULTS: Between 2007 and October 2010, 172 950 people opened a basic HealthSpace account. 2913 (0.13% of those invited) opened an advanced account, compared with 5-10% of the population anticipated in the original business case. Overall, patients perceived HealthSpace as neither useful nor easy to use and its functionality aligned poorly with their expectations and self management practices. Those who used email-style messaging were positive about its benefits, but enthusiasm beyond three early adopter clinicians was low, and fewer than 100 of 30 000 patients expressed interest. Policy makers' hopes that "deploying" HealthSpace would lead to empowered patients, personalised care, lower NHS costs, better data quality, and improved health literacy were not realised over the three year evaluation period. CONCLUSION: Unless personal electronic health records align closely with people's attitudes, self management practices, identified information needs, and the wider care package (including organisational routines and incentive structures for clinicians), the risk that they will be abandoned or not adopted at all is substantial. Conceptualising such records dynamically (as components of a socio-technical network) rather than statically (as containers for data) and employing user centred design techniques might improve their chances of adoption and use. The findings raise questions about how eHealth programmes in England are developed and approved at policy level

Introduction of shared electronic records: multi-site case study using diffusion of innovation theory.

OBJECTIVE: To explore the introduction of a centrally stored, shared electronic patient record (the summary care record (SCR)) in England and draw wider lessons about the implementation of large scale information technology projects in health care. DESIGN: Multi-site, mixed method case study applying utilisation focused evaluation. SETTING: Four early adopter sites for the SCR in England-three in urban areas of relative socioeconomic deprivation and the fourth in a relatively affluent rural area. Data sources and analysis Data included 250 staff interviews, 1500 hours of ethnographic observation, interviews and focus groups with 170 patients and carers, 2500 pages of correspondence and documentary evidence, and incorporation of relevant surveys and statistics produced by others. These were analysed by using a thematic approach drawing on (and extending) a theoretical model of complex change developed in a previous systematic review. Main findings The mixed fortunes of the SCR programme in its first year were largely explained by eight interacting influences. The first was the SCR's material properties (especially technical immaturity and lack of interoperability) and attributes (especially the extent to which potential adopters believed the benefits outweighed the risks). The second was adopters' concerns (especially about workload and the ethicality of sharing "confidential" information on an implied consent model). The third influence was interpersonal influence (for example, opinion leaders, champions, facilitators), and the fourth was organisational antecedents for innovation (for example past experience with information technology projects, leadership and management capacity, effective data capture systems, slack resources). The fifth was organisational readiness for the SCR (for example, innovation-system fit, tension for change, power balances between supporters and opponents, baseline data quality). The sixth was the implementation process (including the nature of the change model and the extent to which new routines associated with the SCR aligned with existing organisational routines). The seventh influence was the nature and quality of links between different parts of the system, and the final one was the wider environment (especially the political context of the programme). CONCLUSION: Shared electronic records are not plug-in technologies. They are complex innovations that must be accepted by individual patients and staff and also embedded in organisational and inter-organisational routines. This process is heavily influenced at the micro-level by the material properties of the technology, individuals' attitudes and concerns, and interpersonal influence; at the meso-level by organisational antecedents, readiness, and operational aspects of implementation; and at the macro-level by institutional and socio-political forces. A case study approach and multi-level theoretical analysis can illuminate how contextual factors shape, enable, and constrain new, technology supported models of patient care

Introduction of shared electronic records: Multi-site case study using diffusion of innovation theory

Objective: To explore the introduction of a centrally stored, shared electronic patient record (the summary care record (SCR)) in England and draw wider lessons about the implementation of large scale information technology projects in health care. Design: Multi-site, mixed method case study applying utilisation focused evaluation. Setting: Four early adopter sites for the SCR in England - three in urban areas of relative socioeconomic deprivation and the fourth in a relatively affluent rural area. Data sources and analysis: Data included 250 staff interviews, 1500 hours of ethnographic observation, interviews and focus groups with 170 patients and carers, 2500 pages of correspondence and documentary evidence, and incorporation of relevant surveys and statistics produced by others. These were analysed by using a thematic approach drawing on (and extending) a theoretical model of complex change developed in a previous systematic review. Main findings: The mixed fortunes of the SCR programme in its first year were largely explained by eight interacting influences. The first was the SCR's material properties (especially technical immaturity and lack of interoperability) and attributes (especially the extent to which potential adopters believed the benefits outweighed the risks). The second was adopters' concerns (especially about workload and the ethicality of sharing "confidential" information on an implied consent model). The third influence was interpersonal influence (for example, opinion leaders, champions, facilitators), and the fourth was organisational antecedents for innovation (for example, past experience with information technology projects, leadership and management capacity, effective data capture systems, slack resources). The fifth was organisational readiness for the SCR (for example, innovation-system fit, tension forchange, power balances between supporters and opponents, baseline data quality). The sixth was the implementation process (including the nature of the change model and the extent to which new routines associated with the SCR aligned with existing organisational routines). The seventh influence was the nature and quality of links between different parts of the system, and the final one was the wider environment (especially the political context of the programme). Conclusion: Shared electronic records are not plug-in technologies. They are complex innovations that must be accepted by individual patients and staff and also embedded in organisational and inter-organisational routines. This process is heavily influenced at the microlevel by the material properties of the technology, individuals' attitudes and concerns, and interpersonal influence; at the meso-level by organisational antecedents, readiness, and operational aspects of implementation; and at the macro-level by institutional and socio-political forces. A case study approach and multi-level theoretical analysis can illuminate how contextual factors shape, enable, and constrain new, technology supported models of patient care

Introduction of shared electronic records: Multi-site case study using diffusion of innovation theory

Objective: To explore the introduction of a centrally stored, shared electronic patient record (the summary care record (SCR)) in England and draw wider lessons about the implementation of large scale information technology projects in health care. Design: Multi-site, mixed method case study applying utilisation focused evaluation. Setting: Four early adopter sites for the SCR in England - three in urban areas of relative socioeconomic deprivation and the fourth in a relatively affluent rural area. Data sources and analysis: Data included 250 staff interviews, 1500 hours of ethnographic observation, interviews and focus groups with 170 patients and carers, 2500 pages of correspondence and documentary evidence, and incorporation of relevant surveys and statistics produced by others. These were analysed by using a thematic approach drawing on (and extending) a theoretical model of complex change developed in a previous systematic review. Main findings: The mixed fortunes of the SCR programme in its first year were largely explained by eight interacting influences. The first was the SCR's material properties (especially technical immaturity and lack of interoperability) and attributes (especially the extent to which potential adopters believed the benefits outweighed the risks). The second was adopters' concerns (especially about workload and the ethicality of sharing "confidential" information on an implied consent model). The third influence was interpersonal influence (for example, opinion leaders, champions, facilitators), and the fourth was organisational antecedents for innovation (for example, past experience with information technology projects, leadership and management capacity, effective data capture systems, slack resources). The fifth was organisational readiness for the SCR (for example, innovation-system fit, tension forchange, power balances between supporters and opponents, baseline data quality). The sixth was the implementation process (including the nature of the change model and the extent to which new routines associated with the SCR aligned with existing organisational routines). The seventh influence was the nature and quality of links between different parts of the system, and the final one was the wider environment (especially the political context of the programme). Conclusion: Shared electronic records are not plug-in technologies. They are complex innovations that must be accepted by individual patients and staff and also embedded in organisational and inter-organisational routines. This process is heavily influenced at the microlevel by the material properties of the technology, individuals' attitudes and concerns, and interpersonal influence; at the meso-level by organisational antecedents, readiness, and operational aspects of implementation; and at the macro-level by institutional and socio-political forces. A case study approach and multi-level theoretical analysis can illuminate how contextual factors shape, enable, and constrain new, technology supported models of patient care